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Abstract 
 
Attacks on the P-value are nothing new, but the recent attacks are increasingly more serious. 
They come from more mainstream sources, with widening targets such as a call to “retire” the 
significance testing altogether. While well meaning, I believe these attacks are nevertheless 
misdirected: Blaming the P-value for the naturally tentative trial-and-error process of scientific 
discoveries, and presuming that banning the P-value would make the process cleaner and less 
error-prone. However tentative, the skeptical scientists still have to form unambiguous opinions, 
proximately to move forward in their investigations and ultimately to present results to the wider 
community.  With obvious reasons, they constantly need to balance between the false-positive 
and false-negative errors. How would banning the P-value or significance tests help in this 
balancing act? It seems trite to say that this balance will always depend on the relative costs or 
the trade-off between the errors. These costs are highly context specific, varying by area of 
applications or by stage of investigation. A calibrated but tunable knob, such as that given by the 
P-value, is needed for controlling this balance. This paper presents detailed arguments in support 
of the P-value. 
 
 
 
Introduction 
If you are an applied statistician or scientist, you are very likely using significance tests and 
producing P-values regularly. So it may not escape your attention that there are numerous attacks 
on the P-value. These attacks are of course not new, but the recent ones appear to come from 
mainstream sources and their target range has widened. The level varies from benign, to medium, 
to severe. On the benign end: Benjamin et al (2018) in Nature Human Behaviour simply 
suggested that we stop using 0.05 cutoff and start using 0.005 instead. Amrhein et al (2019) in 
Nature stepped up the attack and reported more than 800 supporting votes, including many in 
academia, in their call to “retire” statistical significance. They are not banning the P-value per se, 
but calling for the dismantling of significance testing. According to them, we should not say 
“statistically significant” and “not statistically significant”; in general, we should “quit 
categorizing”.  They do not mind confidence intervals, but are of course against using them as the 
basis for claiming statistically significant results. “[A]uthors will emphasize their estimates and 
the uncertainty in them – for example, by explicitly discussing the lower and upper limits of their 
intervals.” 
Going further on the severity spectrum: the journal Epidemiology bans the P-value altogether, but 
not confidence intervals; actually this has been its practice since its founding in 1990. On the 
most extreme end of the spectrum, the journal Basic and Applied Social Psychology since 2015 
had banned the P-value, or more generally the Null Hypothesis Significance Testing Procedure. 
They claim that this procedure is invalid, because it suffers from the “inverse inference problem.” 
The confidence interval also suffers from the same problem, so it is also banned. For the 
Bayesian procedures, the Editors “reserve the right to make case-by-case judgements”, so they 
are neither required nor banned. 
The non-technical meta-literature on the P-value is enormous. Just the special issue of The 
American Statistician -- an official journal of the American Statistical Association -- in March 
2019 alone contains 43 papers (401 total pages). It is practically impossible for a person to absorb 
the diversity of opinion among the experts, let alone the non-experts. What I find most interesting 
is perhaps the explicit opinion of the Editors, as to some extent they represent mainstream 
academic statisticians. Echoing Amrhein et al (2019), the Recommendation 2 in their editorial 
clearly states “Don’t Say ‘Statistically Significant’, and they wrote:  “… it is time to stop the term 
“statistically significant” entirely. Nor should variants such as ‘significantly different’, ‘p < 0.05’, 
and ‘nonsignificant’ survive.” 
This debate is not likely to die out soon. In August 2019 the Journal of American Medical 
Association (JAMA) Psychiatry published an article “Is It Time to Ban the P-value?” by HC 
Kraemer from the Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, Stanford University, not 
exactly some out-of-the-way place. Book-length treatment is not as common. The title The Cult 
of Statistical Significance and the subtitle How the Standard Error Costs Us Jobs, Justice, and 
Lives of the book by Stephen Ziliak and Deirdre McCloskey (2008) clearly convey the views of 
the authors. 
How are we to react to these attacks on the P-value and significance test? As you continue to read 
this article it should be become obvious which side I am on, so I might as well say it explicitly 
now: Banning P-value or significance test is a bad idea; “quit categorizing” defeats the purpose of 
scientific investigation; reducing the threshold from 0.05 or 0.005 might be sensible for new 
discoveries, but not a good idea as a blanket rule. 
 
When the P-value is unavoidable 
There are a number of common statistical problems and applications where banning the P-value 
is awkward and not sensible. Here are some of them: 
• Displaying and comparing Kaplan-Meier survival curves. These are among the most 
common plots in medical applications. What if we are not allowed to report the standard 
log-rank statistic and its P-value? We could report the hazard ratio and its confidence 
intervals, but this is model-dependent, for example it assumes proportional hazards. We 
could provide confidence bands, but then what do we state: are we allowed to focus on the 
areas where the confidence bands do not overlap? On the technical side, there is of course 
an issue of simultaneous inference across time axis, but this effort would also violate the 
idea of not using confidence intervals for significance testing. 
• Wilcoxon and non-parametric rank tests in general. Technically there is an underlying 
parameter associated with a rank test, but who in practice knows what specific parameter 
is being tested by the Wilcoxon test? It is not at all clear whether an estimate and 
confidence interval for such a parameter, e.g. using the Hodges-Lehmann estimator, are 
informative for the readers. 
• Trend tests across an ordinal axis; e.g. is there a trend in the risk of death across the low-
medium-high exposure group? The test may depend on an arbitrary scaling of the x-axis, 
so the estimated slope and its confidence interval are not a meaningful numbers. 
• Any test with more than one degree of freedom: ANOVA tests of multiple groups or 
interactions, or χ2 test of independence or goodness-of-fit or model-checking. When we 
test the association between, say, 4 eye colors and 3 hair colors, the χ2-statistic has (4-1) x 
(3-1) = 6 degrees of freedom. This means there are 6 independent underlying parameters 
that are being tested. What are they? It is possible to write them down, but they are simply 
not interesting. Providing the estimate and confidence interval for each would be absurd. 
• Because of its importance in molecular medical research, in the genome-wide association 
studies, the plot of a very large collection (millions) of P-values – also called the 
Manhattan plot – is a primary output of the analysis. It is simply not sensible to show one 
million confidence intervals. 
• In the ubiquitous multiplicity problems, the P-value is often the raw ingredient for further 
adjustment to account for multiplicity. It is very simple to adjust the P-value, for example, 
using the Bonferroni correction. If the estimates and confidence intervals are given, with 
some calculations, though not in your head, you can recompute the confidence intervals to 
adjust for multiplicity, but this is rarely done. 
• From a theoretical point view, the construction of confidence interval requires a 
continuous parametric model, or at least semi-parametric, whereas the P-value only 
requires one model under the null hypothesis. For example, in spatial point-process 
applications we first want to test whether a homogeneous Poisson process fits the data. If 
yes, there is not much more we can investigate. It does not make sense to build a more 
complex nonhomogeneous Poisson model, for example, a competition process or a cluster 
point process, and to provide an estimate and confidence interval for the parameters of 
that process. 
• Last but not least: a great contribution of statistics is in the theory of – or at least in the 
explicit considerations for -- design of experiments. Above all, thinking about design 
issues prior to starting the study forces a good discipline on the experimenters. 
Theoretically the concepts of testing, test statistic, significance level, power, and sample 
size are closely connected. Banning the P-value must also mean banning the test statistic, 
since there is one-to-one map between them. Without the test statistic it does not make 
sense to talk about power and sample size. Overall, much of the good statistical ideas 
from the theory of design of experiments would have to be abandoned. 
 Reasons to ban the P-value 
Let us assess some commonly stated reasons to ban the P-value. Number one, because people 
often misinterpret it as the probability of the null hypothesis. Is that really a mortal sin? P-value is 
not the probability of observed data given the null hypothesis (that would be the likelihood of the 
null). P-value is more complex: the probability of the observed data or something more extreme 
than the observed data assuming the null hypothesis is true. So P-value is not a transversal of the 
Bayesian posterior: 
 P-value = P(observed data or more extreme|H0) 
 Bayesian posterior = P(H0*|observed data). 
(The notation H0* is used for the Bayesian posterior to indicate it may not be exactly the same set 
as H0 for the P-value. E.g. H0: μ = 0, but H0*: μ ≤ 0 for a typical testing of the normal mean 
parameter.) 
In regular problems, the kind that lead to complaints about the inferential meaning of P-value, the 
P-value is indeed not a probability of the null hypothesis, but it is a valid measure of 
“confidence” (Pawitan 2001, Chapter 5). This non-Bayesian concept of confidence is the same 
“confidence” that we use in “confidence interval,” so it is a fully mainstream concept. 
Unfortunately, it is rarely used in its full capacity as a measure of uncertainty. The recent book by 
Schweder and Hjort (2016) gives a comprehensive exposition. Thus, we may report, say, the 95% 
confidence interval 2.1 < μ < 3.9, meaning that specific interval has 95% confidence. The (one-
sided right-side) P-value for the null hypothesis H0: μ = 0 is the confidence associated with μ ≤ 0.  
Furthermore, theoretically, the confidence distribution is a Bayesian posterior for a certain 
implied prior distribution (implied by the choice of P-value) (Fraser, 2011; Efron and Tibshirani, 
1993, Chapter 24). In summary, mathematically we may interpret the P-value as a confidence 
measure and as a Bayesian posterior probability. So the reason to ban the P-value because it is not 
a probability of null hypothesis is not theoretically justified. It is a confidence measure in a 
relevant null hypothesis (such as μ ≤ 0 for one sided P-value) and it has the same logical status 
and epistemic value as the Bayesian posterior probability for a certain choice prior distribution. 
Now we can see also that to ban the P-value, but “might consider” the Bayesian alternative, 
shows a lack of theoretical understanding. 
The second common reason: people use the P-value carelessly, thus produce many misleading 
results, primarily false positives or hyped claims. We know this because many results indeed fail 
to replicate. Statisticians should of course care about not producing misleading results. Most of 
our theories in statistics is based on optimizing error rates. But, as we all know, there is a type-I 
error and a type-II error. Whatever we say about a hypothesis, there is a chance we make an error. 
If we declare significance we may make type-I error, which is a sin of commission; if non-
significance, we might commit type-II error, a sin of omission. A good procedure should balance 
between the two errors, and a good statistician or scientist should be aware of both at all times. 
But how is that achieved by banning the P-value? 
Benjamin et al (2018)’s modest suggestion of reducing the P-value threshold of significance to 
0.005 goes a long way towards reducing false positive rates. But even this sensible suggestion 
cannot be applied as a blanket rule to all studies, because it will increase the type-II error rate. 
For example, for a validation study, a 0.05 threshold could be sufficient. Together with the 
original study, the cumulative evidence for real effect is much stronger. But, in practical scientific 
activities, this is where a grey area appears: what constitutes a “validation” study? Does it have to 
be by the same research group as the original discovery? If not, does it count as validation if the 
idea of the study comes after reading a journal article?  
But scientists might argue that most of their studies are based on a chain of previous studies and 
results, either by themselves or by their collaborators or by complete strangers; the studies are 
never completely new, based on an idea that appears out-of-blue. Also, to be a “validation” study, 
does the study have to be as similar as the original? The original study could be done in mice, 
does a human version constitute a validation? A phase-III clinical trial to get the US Federal Drug 
Agency’s approval for a drug typically use 0.05 threshold for significance. At that point the drug 
has already undergone thorough and numerous investigations to establish its biological basis, so 
the human trial is a form of validation.  
Eventually, if a question is important enough, there should be many similar studies performed as 
(near)-replicates, so a systematic meta-analyses can be done to get a more definitive answer with 
a very strong P-value. 
Perhaps the most legitimate concern about the P-value is that it does not capture the increased 
uncertainty due to various steps and decisions – some documented and some undocumented -- we 
make during data analysis: choice of wording in a questionnaire, definition of new variables for 
analysis, choice of transformation, choice of split when analyzing categories, choice of model 
class, decisions regarding inclusion and exclusion criteria, choice of variable(s) for sub-group 
analysis, handling of missing data, etc. Explicit model selection, for example, the best-subset 
regression, is known to produce optimistic P-values from the final selected model. But how do 
we account for all various steps, some of which are often taken with the thought of increasing the 
sensitivity of the experiment, hence potentially giving an optimistic P-value? 
Overcoming the weakness of the P-value as a discovery tool, science has a safety measure by 
evolving a skeptical culture. It is rare for any scientific result to be accepted by the relevant 
research community – the group most knowledgeable with the details of the area, hence not as 
easily fooled as the general public. The simple requirement is that a result gets established by 
external validation and reproducibility. The harder the validation the stronger the result would be. 
What constitute a “hard validation”? As I have indicated above, a scientific validation does not 
mean a result based on a study as similar as possible to the original study. In fact, it is better to 
validate in distinct studies. For example, a biological finding from human study can be first 
validated in zebra-fish, then in mice, then back in human. All relates to the same biology, but 
perhaps with different measurements. Good scientific results should lead to a deeper theory, 
which in turn should produce novel predictions for future experiments. These future experiments, 
even with completely distinct measurements, will constitute a validation of the original study or 
theory. In summary, reproducibility is a must in science, though it must be seen as a general 
concept. 
Most opponents of the P-value and its 0.05 threshold point their finger to R.A. Fisher, one of the 
greatest statisticians of the 20th century. With his highly influential Statistical Methods for 
Research Workers, including the practical Tables for various common statistics, Fisher certainly 
popularized the 0.05 limit.  In a paper in 1926 he wrote (with my emphasis): 
… Personally, the writer prefers to set a low standard of significance at the 5 per cent 
point, and ignore entirely all results which fail to reach this level. A scientific fact should 
be regarded as experimentally established only if a properly designed experiment rarely 
fails to give this level of significance. 
As a practicing scientist, Fisher started with a “low standard” 0.05 limit, but note the key words 
“rarely fail” as it clearly implies that he required successful validation studies before accepting a 
scientific fact as established. He was also careful to state that this was his personal preference. 
The proper balance between type-I and type-II error is highly context-dependent. In research 
areas where discoveries are rare, or, if a potential discovery – if real – is fundamental, or, if false 
positives are easy to dismiss, it is not sensible to have a very stringent P-value cut-off, as it 
lowers sensitivity. In such a situation the researchers would be happy to pursue any reasonable 
lead. Though Fisher did not elaborate, he obviously did not mind the cost of false positives from 
his “low standard” threshold, since it gave him higher chances of seeing the true positives. 
On the other hand, when potential discoveries are abundant and establishing a scientific fact is 
expensive – for example, in genome-wide association studies (GWAS) or in high-energy physics 
– one should be very stringent with P-value cutoff. The standard cutoff is 5x10-8 in GWAS, and 
3x10-7 in high-energy physics. 
 
How to quit categorizing? 
I believe the proposal to ban the term “statistically significant” or “significantly different”, and to 
“quit categorizing” is downright unhelpful. Unfortunately, the proposers do not give good 
examples how to report statistical results. So let us try this ourselves. Mack et al (2019) reported 
the result of the study on transcatheter aortic-valve replacement with a balloon-expandable valve 
in the New England Journal of Medicine. Here is how the result and conclusion paragraphs 
appear in the Abstract. Some offending parts are highlighted with bold or underline, and both if 
we quit categorizing and ban the P-values; they do cover much substance of the results: 
RESULTS At 71 centers, 1000 patients underwent randomization. The mean age of the 
patients was 73 years, and the mean Society of Thoracic Surgeons risk score was 1.9% 
(with scores ranging from 0 to 100% and higher scores indicating a greater risk of death 
within 30 days after the procedure). The Kaplan–Meier estimate of the rate of the primary 
composite end point at 1 year was significantly lower in the TAVR group than in the 
surgery group (8.5% vs. 15.1%; absolute difference, −6.6 percentage points; 95% 
confidence interval [CI], −10.8 to −2.5; P<0.001 for noninferiority; hazard ratio, 0.54; 
95% CI, 0.37 to 0.79; P=0.001 for superiority). At 30 days, TAVR resulted in a lower 
rate of stroke than surgery (P=0.02) and in lower rates of death or stroke (P=0.01) 
and new-onset atrial fibrillation (P<0.001). TAVR also resulted in a shorter index 
hospitalization than surgery (P<0.001) and in a lower risk of a poor treatment 
outcome (death or a low Kansas City Cardiomyopathy Questionnaire score) at 30 
days (P<0.001). There were no significant between-group differences in major vascular 
complications, new permanent pacemaker insertions, or moderate or severe paravalvular 
regurgitation.” 
CONCLUSIONS Among patients with severe aortic stenosis who were at low surgical 
risk, the rate of the composite of death, stroke, or rehospitalization at 1 year was 
significantly lower with TAVR than with surgery.  
Here is what happens if we clean the Abstract from the offending parts, still allowing confidence 
intervals, but not P-values: 
At 71 centers, 1000 patients underwent randomization. The mean age of the patients was 
73 years, and the mean Society of Thoracic Surgeons risk score was 1.9% (with scores 
ranging from 0 to 100% and higher scores indicating a greater risk of death within 30 
days after the procedure). The Kaplan–Meier estimate of the rate of the primary 
composite end point at 1 year was 8.5% in the TAVR group and 15.1% in the surgery 
group (absolute difference, −6.6 percentage points; 95% confidence interval [CI], −10.8 to 
−2.5; hazard ratio, 0.54; 95% CI, 0.37 to 0.79). 
As a scientific statement, the last sentence looks acceptable, but, without categorical direction, 
the statement seems dry and harder to absorb than the original. The second half of the original 
abstract must go because all statements are categorical. Finally, as a plea to all proposers of 
banning the significance test and the term “significantly different,” please tell us how to 
formulate the conclusion statement. If “significantly lower” is not allowed, how about just 
“lower”? But it is still categorical, and it will be less informative to the readers. The second half 
of the Results paragraph looks like “sizeless science” as complained by Ziliak and McCloskey 
(2008), but the results could of course be reported in terms of statistics and confidence intervals. 
They would just entail an undigested list of numbers as given in Table 2 of the paper (below). 
Thus effect sizes of the secondary end-points are indeed available within the paper, but the 
authors have to make choices due to limited space in the Abstract. Even stylistic considerations 
alone would stop most authors from simply giving a tedious list of numbers in their Abstract. 
 
 Table 2 from Mack et al (2019), New England Journal of Medicine 380: 1695-1705. 
 
Life without any statistical inference 
How is life without the P-value or any statistical inference in the journal Basic and Applied 
Social Psychology (BASP)? Here is one example from a recent article: “Sorry is the Hardest 
Word to Say: The Role of Self-Control in Apologizing” by Guilfoyle et al (2019). The Abstract is 
as follows; the key statistical results are highlighted. 
“Apologizing is an effective strategy for reconciling relationships after transgressions. 
However, transgressors often resist or refuse to apologize. The current research 
investigated the role of self-control in apologizing. In Study 1, self-control was associated 
with participants’ proclivity to apologize and apologetic and nonapologetic behavior. In 
Studies 2 and 3, self-control was manipulated to test the causal relationship. Both studies 
found participants with high self-control were more apologetic and less 
nonapologetic and were more likely to use apologetic statements in e-mails to their 
victims. Overall, these studies suggest that transgressors with high self-control are more 
apologetic than those with low self-control.” 
Now, in the body of the paper, we can find the supporting evidence for the statements in the 
Abstract: 
…, those in the high self-control group reported greater apology (M = 5.08, SD = 1.45) 
than those in the low self-control group (M = 4.76, SD = 1.50), d = 0.22 (Figure 1). We 
also found that those in the low self-control condition reported greater nonapology 
(M = 3.12, SD = 0.79) than those in the high self-control group 
(M = 2.95, SD = 1.00), d = 0.19 (Figure 2).  
Hence, as promised, no statistical tests need to be reported, though it is not clear if the authors 
had actually performed them prior to submission to BASP. Interestingly, the text does not state 
the standard errors, but the figures do. Using the standard deviations (SDs) in the figures would 
give alarmingly large error bars; but it is arguable whether you should be allowed to show 
standard errors, since they are inferential quantities, not summary statistics of the data. Is this 
kind of scientific reporting meant to be better than reporting with P-values? Remarkably, the 
impact factor of BASP increased from 1.3 in 2015 to 3.4 in 2017, no doubt giving the editors a 
great feeling of vindication, but it then went down to 1.0 in 2018 and 1.58 in 2019. 
 
 
 
 
Figures 1 and 2 from Guilfoyle et al (2019), Basic and Applied Social Psychology 41: 72-90. The 
error bars represent standard errors. 
 
If you are like me, you are probably curious as to what kind of people want to ban the P-value 
and statistical inference. Among the 43 papers in the 2019 Special Issue of TAS, there is one by 
Valentin Amrhein, David Trafimow and Sander Greenland. Now S Greenland is well known to 
many statisticians; V Amrhein is the one who wanted to ban statistical significance; and D 
Trafimow is the Editor of BASP.  The article is titled “Inferential statistics as descriptive 
statistics: there is no replication crisis if we don't expect replication.” Here is the Abstract, which 
makes for strange reading for a scientist, and I highlight one sentence that perhaps captures the 
attitude of the authors: 
“Nonetheless, considerable non-replication is to be expected even without selective 
reporting, and generalizations from single studies are rarely if ever warranted. Honestly 
reported results must vary from replication to replication because of varying assumption 
violations and random variation; excessive agreement itself would suggest deeper 
problems. … Since a small P-value could be large in a replication study, and a large P-
value could be small, there is simply no need to selectively report studies based on 
statistical results. Rather than focusing our study reports on uncertain conclusions, we 
should thus focus on describing accurately how the study was conducted, what problems 
occurred, what data were obtained, what analysis methods were used and why, and what 
output those methods produced.” 
In the text, we can read 
“Reaching for statistical tests to force out "inferences" (whether traditional "p≤α" testing 
or substitutes like tests using Bayes-factor criteria) is, like drinking alcohol, a culturally 
ingrained habit. Statistical testing (like alcohol) often gives the wrong impression that 
complex decisions can be oversimplified without negative consequences.... And many 
researchers are addicted to such oversimplification. These addictions are worth breaking.” 
 
Conclusions 
I guess that the people who write proposals to ban the P-value or significance tests, or the editors 
of journals that ban them, are well-meaning with no hidden agenda. I cannot see any profit to be 
made by holding such a point of view. However, we know that it is possible to be well-meaning 
and unhelpful. There is a tendency in their writing to consider only the common problem of 
comparing two groups with simple parametric one-degree of freedom tests; I mentioned several 
common problems where it is awkward not to use the P-value. The unfortunate result is that good 
suggestions – e.g. to pay attention to the estimates of effect sizes – are mixed with bad proposals 
and arguments. For example, Ziliak and McCloskey (2008) invented the term “sizeless science” 
as the straw man in their polemical book. In practice, when results are written down for 
publications, other factors come into play. As we show above, in the Abstract section of a paper, 
limited space considerations might lead to few details about effect sizes. But it would be highly 
unusual for the Results section not to report effect sizes. 
In the process of developing the light-bulb, between 1878 and 1880 the legendary inventor 
Thomas Alva Edison (and his associates) famously worked on at least 3,000 different theories, 
trying out no fewer than 6,000 materials. Let us imagine his state of mind during the period: 
would he be arbitrary, not paying attention to the signal-to-noise ratio? How stringent would he 
be in the beginning investigation of a new material or design? How stringent would he be when a 
filament is showing promise? Finally, how stringent would he be on the design that he would be 
happy to patent? I imagine, like Fisher, most scientists today would work in a similar way: in the 
beginning quite happy looking for many possible leads, not afraid of false positives, but not going 
in completely arbitrary direction either; and, once there is a promising direction, putting a lot of 
efforts to validation studies. 
The biggest difference is of course that Edison did not have to publish anything. Modern 
scientists have to publish even not-so-final findings; once published, there is no control who 
would consume the information and how the information is further disseminated. The skeptical 
scientists have no problem with the tentative nature of scientific results, even when presented 
categorically, as they would expect that validation studies will eventually screen out false 
positives. But the general public might get confused with this potentially chaotic process; this 
issue of course deserves its own discussion session. The point I would like to make here is that 
banning the P-value and significance tests seems to be motivated by the wish to reduce/avoid 
public confusion of scientific results, which are tentative by their nature, but this wish is contrary 
to the daily activities and needs of practicing scientists. 
Finally, as is well-known in statistics we have a long-standing unresolved philosophical debate 
between the frequentist and the Bayesian schools. Most Bayesians do not accept the P-value; 
theoretically the P-value violates the likelihood principle (Pawitan, 2001, Chapter 7). And, they 
also claim that the P-value misrepresents the level of evidence against the null hypothesis. They 
would instead suggest the Bayes Factor as an alternative to the P-value. So, an attack on the P-
value from the Bayesians is nothing new. It is possible that some of the current attackers are 
partly motivated by the old Bayesian dislike of the P-value, but the proposal to ban significance 
tests altogether should also apply to the use Bayes Factor, so it appears distinct from the 
Bayesian-frequentist debate. 
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